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AFGHAN CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM II, END-LINE REPORT

EXAMINING ACAP II'S PMP INDICATORS

JULY 12, 2014

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Jason Lyall, Management Systems International.

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Management Systems International
Corporate Offices

200 12th Street, South
Arlington, VA 22202 USA

Tel: + 1 703 979 7100

Contracted under AID-OAA-I-10-00002, Task Order AID-306-TO-12-00004

Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This brief document explores end-line Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II) performance using two Performance Management Plan (PMP)-specified indicators. Data are drawn from four waves of a custom survey (administered on the implementing partner IRD's behalf by D3 Systems and ACSOR) encompassing 3,045 respondents in 16 provinces during 2013.

Major trends include:

- Tailored Assistance (TA) finds strong support among recipients: 60% agreed that TA had allowed them to “rebuild their lives” after the violent incident while 74% believed it had “greatly” or “somewhat” improved their post-incident lives.
- Several provinces—notably, Helmand, Logar, Laghman, and Wardak – remain the most difficult environments for ACAP II assistance, as indicated by their lower-than-average scores on ACAP II performance indicators. Aid recipients in Ghazni remain the most enthusiastic supporters of ACAP II programming. Key provinces (Khost, Kunar, and Kandahar most notably) present a more mixed picture, depending on the ACAP II PMP being used.
- Beneficiary answers are strongly affected by the nature of the violent incident experienced. Satisfaction with ACAP II performance, for example, consistently ranks higher after some types of events (e.g. airstrikes) than for others (e.g. roadside IEDs).
- ACAP II assistance scores lowest when judged using the respondents’ perception of fairness of aid delivery. Only 41% of respondents reported that they believed they received similar levels of assistance as their neighbors. There are important regional differences here: 79% of recipients in Kabul believed that they received similar assistance to other families, while only 21% in Farah held the same belief.
- TA is associated with higher beneficiary satisfaction across all indicators, provinces, and types of violent incidents compared with Immediate Assistance (IA) recipients. The net difference in responses ranges as high as a 29% increase in satisfaction when compared with responses from IA beneficiaries.

I METHOD

The sample includes 1,314 respondents who received ACAP II Immediate Assistance (IA); 724 respondents who received ACAP II Tailored Assistance (TA); and 1,007 interviews with randomly selected individuals who were present in the village when the violent incident that precipitated ACAP II assistance occurred but who were not harmed by this action. These individuals act as a baseline from which comparison can be made to TA and IA recipients in the absence of pre-event baseline data. The survey was conducted in March, June, September, and November/December 2013.

These beneficiaries were involved in 268 incidents across 16 provinces in the period from October 2011 to July 2013. Respondents were overwhelmingly male (99%), Pashtun (82%), and relatively young (37 years on average). About 70% reported holding full time employment. Respondents on average possessed six years of schooling. The majority (69%) of interviews were conducted in areas with strong or moderate ISAF presence; 26% were conducted in areas with strong or moderate Taliban presence.

Simple descriptive tables are provided below for each of ACAP II's four performance indicators. Results are first disaggregated by province, then by the type of violent incident the beneficiaries experienced, for each performance indicator.

2 ACAP II PMP MEASURES

IRD has established two sets of performance indicators. The first indicator focuses on two questions: (1) the percentage of TA recipients who agree that TA has helped them rebuild their lives after the violent incident and (2) the degree of improvement in the life of the family after receipt of ACAP II tailored assistance. These indicators correspond to Question 30 and 31 on the ACAP II Evaluation Survey, respectively. These are reproduced below.¹

- Q-30. (Ask if answered Yes code 1 at Q-21) The additional ACAP II assistance we received helped my family to rebuild our lives:
 1. Entirely from the effects of the violent incident we experienced
 2. Mostly from the effects of the violent incident we experienced
 3. Somewhat from the effects of the violent incident we experienced
 4. Not at all from the effects of the violent incident we experienced
- Q-31. (Ask if answered Yes code 1 at Q-21) Thinking again about the additional assistance you received from ACAP II after the initial assistance, how did the additional assistance that you received change life for your family? Did life for your family greatly improve, somewhat improve, not change, somewhat worsen, or greatly worsen after ACAP II assistance was received?
 1. Life for our family greatly improved after ACAP II assistance was received
 2. Life for our family somewhat improved after ACAP II assistance was received
 3. Life for our family did not change after ACAP II assistance was received
 4. Life for our family somewhat worsened after ACAP II assistance was received
 5. Life for our family greatly worsened after ACAP II assistance was received

The second set of performance indicators centers around whether the ACAP II assistance was delivered in a transparent and fair manner to beneficiary families. As above, two questions (Q-32 and Q-35, respectively) comprise this performance metric and are reprinted below.

- Q-32. (Ask if answered Yes code 1 at Q-21) Please tell me which of these statements best describes your situation. Staff members from ACAP II provided enough information to my family to:
 1. Completely understand what types of assistance we would receive
 2. Mostly understand what types of assistance we would receive
 3. Somewhat understand what types of assistance we would receive
 4. We did not understand at all what types of assistance we would receive
- Q-35. (Ask if answered Yes code 1 at Q-21) ACAP II provided my family with a level of assistance that was similar to other families that experienced the same level of harm as my family:
 1. Yes, ACAP II provided similar levels of assistance to my family
 2. No, ACAP II provided lower levels of assistance to my family
 3. No, ACAP II provided higher levels of assistance to my family

3 DOES ACAP II REBUILD LIVES?

This section focuses on TA and its perceived effect on rebuilding and improving beneficiary lives. Results are first presented by province, then by type of event, comparing TA and IA types of assistance. For both questions, we use percentage of respondents agreeing with the statement that ACAP II assistance “completely

¹ All questions allow the respondent to answer “Don’t Know” as well as “Refuse to Answer.”

or mostly” rebuilt lives (Question-30) and “greatly or somewhat” (Question-31) improved lives after incident. Respondents who replied “Don’t Know” or “Refused” were dropped from this analysis.

In brief, there is substantial evidence that suggests TA recipients believe that ACAP II assistance has helped them rebuild their lives. In 11 of 16 sampled provinces, agreement that ACAP II TA assistance helped individuals “completely or mostly” rebuild their lives exceeds the 50% threshold. There are noticeable geographic differences in reported agreement levels, however. Almost all recipients in Ghazni (95%) agreed that ACAP II assistance had helped rebuild their lives; only 19% in Logar shared that same view. As observed throughout this document, the effects of ACAP II programming are clearly conditioned in part by regional differences; averaging effects without taking into account region-specific differences can lead to misleading conclusions about the efficacy of ACAP II programming.

3.1 Q-30: Percentage of families who report that the tailored assistance provided has helped them to rebuild their lives

TABLE I: Q-30: TA ASSISTANCE ALLOWED US TO “COMPLETELY” OR “MOSTLY” REBUILD OUR LIVES

Province	Agree (%)	Raw Score
Ghazni	95%	38/40
Nangarhar	74%	40/54
Wardak	71%	63/89
Faryab	70%	14/20
Kunar	67%	24/36
Khost	61%	59/96
Kabul	59%	16/27
Kandahar	58%	14/24
Herat	53%	18/34
Laghman	53%	10/19
Farah	51%	22/43

Helmand	50%	26/52
Badghis	50%	2/4
Kapisa	45%	19/42
Paktia	40%	6/15
Logar	19%	6/31

Average	60%	377/626

Note: This table provides provincial-level responses among recipients who agreed that ACAP II Tailored Assistance allowed them to “completely” or “mostly” rebuild their lives. Provinces are ranked in order of greatest to least agreement; dashed line indicates provinces at or below a 50% agreement threshold. Care should be taken when interpreting provincial samples with few recipients (notably, Paktia, Badghis, and Laghman). The 60% estimate is a weighted average of all respondents responding “completely” or “mostly” divided by the total number of respondents in each province.

We also observe fairly large differences in beliefs about the effects of ACAP II programming on individual perceptions about rebuilding lives after experiencing different types of violent events. ACAP II TA assistance is judged most effective (as measured by this PMP indicator) after suicide bombings and airstrikes, and least effective after (traffic) accidents and roadside IEDs.

TABLE 2: Q-30: ACAP II ASSISTANCE ALLOWED US TO “COMPLETELY” OR “MOSTLY” REBUILD OUR LIVES: TA ONLY, BY TYPE OF VIOLENT INCIDENT

Event Type	Agreed (%)	Raw Score
Suicide Bombing	67%	153/229
Airstrikes	61%	44/72
ISAF Military Operations	58%	24/41
Insurgent Military Operations	57%	27/47
Accidents	56%	14/25
Roadside IED	52%	95/184

3.2 Did ACAP II Assistance “Greatly” or “Somewhat” Improve Their Lives?

In brief, we once again observe substantial cross-regional differences in the perceived efficacy of ACAP II assistance to “greatly or somewhat” improve recipients’ lives. Ghazni once again tops the list, with 95% agreeing with this statement. Helmand, by contrast, only observes a 40% agreement with this statement. In general, the same provinces—namely, Helmand, Paktia, Logar, and Laghman – occupy the bottom rung of support for ACAP II, whether measured by either the “rebuild” or “improve” metrics. The same is true of the most receptive locations, notably, Ghazni, Nangarhar, and Faryab.

TABLE 3: Q-31: PERCENTAGE OF TA RESPONDENTS WHO AGREED THAT ACAP II ASSISTANCE “GREATLY” OR “SOMEWHAT” IMPROVED THEIR LIVES

Province	Agree (%)	Raw Score
Ghazni	95%	38/40
Faryab	90%	18/20
Kapisa	88%	37/42
Nangarhar	87%	47/54
Farah	86%	37/43
Herat	82%	28/34
Kunar	78%	28/36
Khost	78%	75/96
Wardak	76%	68/89
Badghis	75%	3/4
Kabul	62%	23/27
Kandahar	63%	15/24
Logar	53%	16/30
Laghman	50%	10/20
Paktia	47%	7/15
Helmand	40%	21/52
Average	74%	467/625

Note: This table provides provincial-level responses among recipients who agreed that ACAP II Tailored Assistance “greatly” or “somewhat” improved their lives. Provinces are ranked in order of greatest to least agreement; dashed line indicates provinces at or below a 50% agreement threshold. Care should be taken when interpreting provincial samples with few recipients (notably, Paktia, Badghis, and Laghman). The 74% estimate is a weighted

average of all respondents responding “completely” or “mostly”
divided by the total number of respondents in each province.

Perceptions of the TA’s ability to improve lives after violent events also hinged on the nature of the violent incidents themselves. We observe that TA’s ability to improve lives is perceived as highest after (traffic) accidents and insurgent military operations and lowest after IEDs and ISAF’s own military operations.

TABLE 4: Q-31: PERCENTAGE OF TA RESPONDENTS WHO AGREED THAT ACAP II ASSISTANCE “GREATLY” OR “SOMEWHAT” IMPROVED THEIR LIVES

Event Type	Agreed (%)	Raw Score
Accidents	88%	22/25
Insurgent Military Operations	81%	38/47
Suicide Bombing	78%	179/230
Airstrikes	71%	51/72
Roadside IED	69%	125/182
ISAF Military Operations	66%	27/41

4 TRANSPARENCY AND FAIRNESS

This section details respondents’ views on the transparency (Q-32) and fairness of aid disbursement (Q-35). For Q-32, we use percentage of those responding that they “completely” or “mostly” understood the information provided by ACAP II about the nature of the assistance that they would receive. Fairness is assessed by asking whether recipients believe that their family received a comparable level of assistance to families that experienced the same level of harm (Q-35). As above, beneficiaries who replied “Don’t Know” or “Refused” are dropped from the analysis. Results are reported first by province, then by type of violent event. Responses to Question 35 are also graphed since the question allows for individuals to report that they received “less” or “more” assistance than their neighbors.

4.1 Q-32 ACAP II Transparency

ACAP II’s PMP also placed special emphasis on measuring the transparency of ACAP II’s delivery. As Table 6 demonstrates, there are considerable inter-province levels of confidence in ACAP II’s transparency. In Ghazni, 87% of recipients agreed that they “completely or mostly” understood the nature of assistance they would receive; only 23% did so in Nangarhar, a clear outlier and the only province that falls below 50% agreement with this statement. These findings also suggest that perceptions of fairness may affect perceptions of ACAP II’s ability to rebuild lives. The lowest ranked provinces for confidence in ACAP II’s transparency are also typically the same provinces where TA’s ability to rebuild lives was judged lowest. (This relationship will bear closer scrutiny in the research paper entitled “Can Aid Short-Circuit Radicalization in Conflict Settings? Evidence from the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II,” now underway by MISTI).

TABLE 5: Q-32: PERCENTAGE OF ALL RESPONDENTS WHO AGREED THAT ACAP II STAFF MEMBERS PROVIDED ENOUGH INFORMATION TO “COMPLETELY” OR “MOSTLY” UNDERSTAND WHAT TYPES OF ASSISTANCE A FAMILY WOULD RECEIVE

Province	Agree (%)	Raw Score
Ghazni	87%	87/101
Kandahar	83%	20/24
Faryab	82%	23/28
Herat	74%	46/62
Wardak	73%	333/459
Kapisa	71%	61/86
Kunar	69%	56/81
Kabul	67%	80/120
Khost	63%	203/322
Badghis	62%	10/16
Paktia	59%	50/85
Farah	58%	79/136
Laghman	57%	21/37
Helmand	56%	43/77
Logar	54%	75/138
Nangarhar	23%	33/144
Average	68%	1294/1916

Note: This table combines IA and TA recipients’ agreement that they “completely” or “mostly” understood the nature of the ACAP II assistance. Provinces are ranked in order of greatest to least agreement; dashed line indicates provinces at or below a 50% agreement threshold. Care should be taken when interpreting provincial samples with few recipients (notably, Paktia, Badghis, and Laghman).

4.2 Q-35 ACAP II Fairness

Taken together, these three initial PMP indicators suggest that ACAP II is having its intended effect on recipients, albeit with often marked regional differences. Performance on the fourth PMP indicator – perceived fairness of amount of assistance delivered – is more mixed, however. Only 7 of 16 provinces record a satisfaction level above 50%, for example, with some levels dipping below 30% (in Kandahar, Wardak, and Farah). Even in Ghazni, where recipients typically enthusiastically embrace the ACAP II program (according to these PMP indicators), confidence in the fairness of ACAP II delivery is only 55%. These findings are worrisome if local level jealousies over aid disbursement spill over to fuel intra-village violence.

TABLE 6: Q-35: DID YOUR FAMILY RECEIVE A SIMILAR LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE AS OTHER FAMILIES? IA AND TA COMBINED RESPONSES


Province	Agree (%)	Raw Score
Kabul	79%	89/113
Paktia	77%	65/84
Kunar	61%	48/78
Logar	57%	79/139
Ghazni	55%	55/100
Faryab	52%	14/27
Kapisa	51%	43/84
Badghis	44%	7/16
Herat	42%	26/62
Khost	42%	138/327
Nangarhar	36%	52/143
Helmand	32%	25/77
Laghman	30%	11/37
Kandahar	29%	7/24
Wardak	22%	100/459
Farah	21%	28/135
Average	41%	787/1905

Note: This table combines IA and TA recipients' agreement that they received a "similar" level of assistance as other families. Provinces are ranked in order of greatest to least agreement; dashed line indicates provinces at or below a 50% agreement threshold. Care should be taken when interpreting provincial samples with few recipients (notably, Badghis and Laghman). The 41% estimate is a weighted average of all respondents responding "completely" or "mostly" divided by the total number of respondents in each province.

It is possible that individuals state that they received "less" or (less plausibly) "more" assistance than their neighbors. As a result, Figure 1 plots the percentage of individuals stating that they received less, similar, and more ACAP II assistance than their neighbors, by program type (IA and TA). A plurality of respondents who received IA believe that they received less than their neighbors, while a slim plurality of TA recipients believe that they received similar amounts. Predictably, few individuals reported that they received a greater amount of assistance than neighbors.

At IRD's request, we can also combine Q32 and Q35 to create an index of individuals who both believed they "completely" or "mostly" understood their assistance and who believed that it was distributed fairly. Of the 724 TA beneficiaries, 242 (or 33%) fall into this category. Another 203 (or 28%) of TA beneficiaries believed that they "completely" or "mostly" understood their assistance but also believed that they received *less* than their neighbors. While ACAP II scores highly in terms of conveying information to TA beneficiaries, reinforcing perceptions of fairness among those beneficiaries remains a challenge.

FIGURE 1: PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS BY ASSISTANCE TYPE



Note: This figure plots the percentage of individuals stating that they received less, similar, and more ACAP II assistance than their neighbors, by program type (IA and TA). These low perceptions of fairness are especially surprising for IA recipients, where assistance is standardized across recipients.

5 COMPARING AID TYPES

Do aid recipients believe that Tailored Assistance and Immediate Assistance have different abilities to respond to civilian victimization? As Table 7 demonstrates, yes, there are sharp differences among TA and IA respondents in their views of the efficacy of ACAP II assistance across aid type and event class. There are sizable differences between TA and IA respondents on nearly every class of event. Indeed, differences in responses about ACAP II's perceived ability to "greatly" or "somewhat" improve individuals' lives are especially large after insurgent military operations (+29%), accidents (+28%), suicide bombings (+20%) and airstrikes (+18%). From a programming point of view, there are clear gains to be had across the board for maximizing the number of TA recipients after nearly every class of event, with only IED detonations showing little difference among recipients.

TABLE 7: Q-31: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO AGREED THAT ACAP II ASSISTANCE “GREATLY” OR “SOMEWHAT” IMPROVED THEIR LIVES, TA/IA COMPARED, BY EVENT TYPE

Event Type	TA Agreed (%)	IA Agreed (%)	Difference
Insurgent Military Operations	81%	52%	+29%
Accidents	88%	60%	+28%
Suicide Bombing	79%	59%	+20%
Airstrikes	71%	57%	+18%
ISAF Military Operations	66%	56%	+10%
Roadside IED	69%	67%	+2%

Note: This table combines IA and TA recipients’ agreement that ACAP II assistance “greatly” or “somewhat” improved their lives. *Difference* is the percentage increase/decrease between TA recipients and IA recipients in their response to the question. Event types are ranked in order of greatest to least difference.

The advantages of providing Tailored Assistance instead of Immediate Assistance also extends to perceptions of fairness, though the results here are less impressive. As Table 8 highlights, TA recipients are more likely to believe that they received a similar level of assistance as others after most classes of events relative to IA-only recipients. The largest difference is observed after airstrikes (+14%), with roadside IED and accident victims also reporting higher levels of perceived fairness after receiving TA relative to IA-only recipients (+8% and +5%, respectively). These differences dissipate for other classes of events.

TABLE 8: Q-35: DID YOUR FAMILY RECEIVE A SIMILAR LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE AS OTHER FAMILIES? TA/IA COMPARED, BY EVENT TYPE

Event Type	TA Agreed (%)	IA Agreed (%)	Difference
Airstrikes	44%	30%	+14%
Roadside IED	53%	45%	+8%
Accidents	32%	27%	+5%
Suicide Bombing	43%	40%	+3%
ISAF Military Operations	26%	27%	-1%
Insurgent Military Operations	42%	44%	-2%

Note: This table combines IA and TA recipients’ agreement that they received a “similar” level of assistance as other families. *Difference* is the percentage increase/decrease between TA recipients and IA recipients in their response to the question. Event types are ranked in order of greatest to least difference.

ANNEX I: RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings contained in this report, following are five initial policy recommendations. Three apply to current (and future) ACAP II programming, while two are more general “lessons learned” that could be applied to future programming aimed at mitigating the effects of violence in conflict settings. MISTI is currently writing a research monograph designed to further extend this initial assessment and to offer additional policy recommendations.

Current ACAP II Programming Efforts

(1) ACAP II should redouble its efforts at highlighting the fairness of its assistance. These could be additional speeches at the distribution events, for example, that emphasize how assistance is similar across victims to prevent perceived inequities in assistance from generating new intra-village grievances and conflict.

(2) ACAP II should explore rebalancing its assistance between TA and IA beneficiaries. It's clear from these data (using USAID's PMP indicators) that TA is received far more favorably than IA assistance. Yet the program held a ratio of about 4:1 IA:TA recipients over the first year of its programming. This is a product of ACAP II's own criteria; families that experience greater trauma are eligible for greater assistance. Relaxing the threshold at which IA is elevated to TA will increase the number of families receiving the more effective form of ACAP II assistance.

(3) Similarly, ACAP II has restrictive criteria for determining an event's eligibility for rendering ACAP II assistance in the first place. Events where ISAF forces are over 1 kilometer away, or where ISAF has vacated a location for 10 minutes, are ineligible for ACAP II assistance. Relaxing these criteria would allow for a greater number of events (and thus victimized individuals) to be eligible for the program, bringing it even closer to its stated humanitarian goals. Moreover, it is doubtful that victimized individuals are aware of (or agree with) these inclusion criteria; they are undoubtedly making their own assessments of whom to blame for the event. There may therefore be a substantial population of victimized individuals who blame ISAF for an event but who were ineligible for receiving ACAP II assistance. As ISAF's withdrawal continues, there will be less ISAF-related incidents to respond to, and so ACAP II may consider shifting its emphasis to events where ISAF's presence is negligible but where civilian need is pressing (i.e. a suicide bombing in a crowded marketplace).

Broader Lessons Learned

1. At present, ACAP II's mandate is to respond to all eligible incidents, regardless of geographic location. Future ACAP II-style programs should explore the possibility of reducing their geographic exposure to areas where assistance has the most positive impact. There are certain provinces in Afghanistan, for example, where there is either insufficient programming to make a serious impact or where public opinion appears to be non-persuadable. Alternatively, there are provinces (especially Ghazni) that appear highly receptive to these aid efforts. If resources are scarce, it would be prudent to concentrate on particular regions once an initial baseline assessment of the assistance's effects has been established. There's little reason to continue to invest resources in unsafe conditions if the local populace cannot be persuaded.
2. At present, ACAP II responds to all eligible events regardless of the class of event. Future ACAP II-style programs should also explore the possibility of privileging responses to certain classes of violent events. In Afghanistan, these would include suicide bombings and airstrikes, the two areas where the greatest positive effect of ACAP II was observed. By contrast, ACAP II effects were typically muted after roadside IEDs, suggesting that different dynamics are at play.